Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1952

Alton H. Davis v. Provo City Corporation, Brigham
Young University et al : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Jackson B. Howard; Attorney for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Davis v. Provo City Corp., No. 7905 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1831

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

..-;Qf'\at

'-~

In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
NOV 2 ;J 195,,2
ALTON H. DAVIS, by and through
his Guardian, GEORGE A. DAVIS,
Appellant,
vs.
PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a
corporation, and RobertS. Clark,
Respondents,

CASE
NO. 7905

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JACKSON B. HOWARD,
Attorney for Appellant

lfiW OW;N1'U&1' Plt.DITINC. 00., PF.OVO, U'I'A.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pag~

STATEMENT OF FACTS.........................

1

STATEMENT OF POINTS........................

3

Point No. I. The complaint does state a cause of
action against Provo City Corporation upon the
ground that the injuries caused to the plaintiff were
the result of the defendant's negligence and that
the negligent acts of the defendant, Provo City Corporation, were not governmental acts such as to
render the defendant immune from liability. . . . . .
Point No. II. The complaint does state a cause of
action against Provo City Corporation upon the
ground that the acts complained of constituted an
attractive nuisance, and that because of these acts,
the plaintiff was attracted to the coasting area and
injured because of its inherent dangers. . . . . . . . .

3

3

Point No. III. That the complaint states a cause of
action against Brigham Young University on two
grounds, (1) negligence and (2) attractive nuisance, and that the allegations of both causes are
sufficient to state a valid claim at law. . . . . . . . . . . .

3

ARGUMENT:
Point No. I .......................... ,........

3

Point No. II..................................
Point No. III. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8
10

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED:
American Jurisprudence, 38 A. J. 263... . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

American Jurisprudence, 38 A. J. 268. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

American Jurisprudence, 38 A. J. 355. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

American Jurisprudence, 38 A. J. 358. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF OONTENTS (Continued)
Page
American Jurisprudence, 38 A. J. 812 ........... · · · ·

19

American Jurisprudence, 38 A. J. 817 ........... · · · .
American Law Reports, 36 A. L. R. 138. . . . . . . . . . . . .

18
19

American Law Reports, 120 A. L. R. 1368. . . . . . . . . .

8

American Law Reports, 120 A. L. R. 1377. . . . . . . . . . . .

5

Corpus Juris, 45 C. J. 768. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

Corpus Juris Secondum, 65 C. J. S. 465..............

13

Corpus Juris Secondum, 65 C. J. S. 610...............

16

Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570 ..... .4, 8
Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253 Pac. 443 ... 4, 6
Cummings v. Kendall, 93 P. 2nd 633, 34 Cal. App. 2nd
379 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

Griffin v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 94. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

Harper v. Vallejo Housing Authority, 232 P. 2d 262, 104
A. C. A. 791.................................

21

Katz v. Helbing, 10 Pac. 2nd 1001, 215 Cal. 449 ...... 13, 21
Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 91, 44 P. 1050 ......·. .

4

Lund v. Salt Lake County, 58 Utah 546, 200 P. 510....

4

Missouri Motor Distributing Company v. Baker, 39 P.
2nd 544, 170 Okl. 183. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

Rost v. Parker Washington Company, 176 Ill. A. 245..

20

Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Cornum, 63
P. 2d 639, 49 Ariz. 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

Seth v. Commonwealth Electric Company, 89 N. E. 452,
241 Ill. 252 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

Shafer v. Keeley Ice Cream Company, 65 Utah 96, 234
P. 300 . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

Styer v. City of Reading, 61 A. 2d 382, 360 Pa. 212. . . .

16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In tlte Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

ALTON H. DAVIS, by and through
his Guardian, GEORGE A. DAVIS,
Appellant,
vs.
PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a
corporation, and Robert S. Clark,
Respondents,

CASE
NO. 7905

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts set forth here are merely the plaintiff's version as to the basis for the complaint, and do not constitute
facts as introduced as evidence, or findings of fact by the
court.
On the 7th day of December, 1951, the plaintiff, a child
of eleven years of age, was injured while coasting down a
coasting course created by the action of Provo City Corpora-
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tion by and through its recreation and public safety departments. The course was· established on a private roadway
on the property of the Brigham Young University, which
roadway runs north and south, the north portion being a
dead end blocked by steel posts. It is at the north end that
the coasting course commenced. There is a .sharp decline
from the north end of the roadway down to where it levels
out at approximately the intersection of the private roadway with Fifth East Street and Eighth North Street in the
City of Provo. The coasting course was in such a line as
to be a continuance north of Fifth East Street in the City
of Provo, if Fifth East Street continued north past Eighth
North Street.
Provo City Corporation had publicized and had made
public the establishment of this coasting course, and had
caused signs purporting to regulate the coasting traffic on
the hill to be placed at various positions on the hill, and
had traffic barriers placed at the intersection of the streets
mentioned above.
On the 7th day of December, 1951, the plaintiff, upon
hearing of the establishment of the hill through the publicity given to its creation, went to the hill, which was approximately a mile from his home, to coast. The hill at
the time was very slick, and the boy was unable to stop his
sled when coming to the saw horse barrier across the bottom of the hill where it intersects Eighth North Street and
Fifth East Street. Because he was unable to stop, he went
under the saw horse and out into Eighth North Street,
striking an automobile driven by the defendant Robert S.
Clark, which was proceeding west along ·Eighth North
Street.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I

The complaint does state a cause of action against Provo City Corporation upon the ground that the injuries
caused to the plaintiff were the result of the defendant's
negligence and that the negligent acts of the defendant,
Provo City Corporation, were not governmental acts such
as to render the defendant immune from liability.
POINT II

The complaint does state a cause of action against Provo City Corporation upon the ground that the acts complained of constituted an attractive nuisance, and that because of these acts, the plaintiff was attracted to the coasting area and injured because of its inherent dangers.
POINT III

That the complaint states a cause of action against
Brigham Young University on two grounds, (1) negligence,
and (2) attractive nuisance, and that the allegations of both
causes are sufficient to state a valid claim at law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMPLAINT DOES STATE A CAUSE OF A:.CTION AGAINST PROVO CITY CORPORATION UPON
THE GROUND THAT THE INJURIES CAUSED TO THE
PLAINTIFF WERE THE RESULT OF THE DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE AND THAT THE NEGLIGENT
ACTS OF THE DEFENDANT, PROVO CITY CORPORA-
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TION, WERE NOT GOVERNMENTAL ACTS SUCH AS
TO RENDER THE DEFENDANT IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY.
In this particular instance, the court made its determination on the basis that the function of operating this
coasting area was a governmental function and, therefore,
was such a function as to render the city immune from liability. However, this is not the case. The decision of the
court is representative of a line of cases of ancient origin,
and does not represent the current trend of the state courts
of the United States nor the recent decisions of the Utah
Supreme Court. The rule in Utah, as enunced in the cases
of Burton vs. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253 P. 443, 51
ALR 364; Lund vs. Salt Lake County, 58 Utah 546, 200 P.
510; Brown vs. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222,93 P. 570; Lowe
vs. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 91, 44 P. 1050, is as follows:

"Insofar, however, as a municipal corporation acts
in its private or proprietary capacity, the general rule
is that it is liable in tort in the same manner as a private corporation * * * * "
38 A. J. 263.
The doctrine of immunity has been predicated upon
various grounds, all of which are archaic and capable of
little legal logic, the first being that of the strict rule that
the sovereign is immune, or as it is commonly stated, ''The
king can do no wrong," or 2) that it is better that an individual should suffer an injury than the public should suffer an inconvenience and (3) that liability would tend to
retard the agents of the city in the performance of their
duties, for fear of suit being brought against the munici-
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pality. These arguments are thoroughly refuted in 120
ALR 1377, in which the author quotes an article in 23 Mich.
L. Rev. 325.
Such thinking can hardly be tolerated in this modem
age. These legal maxims have no place in present society
and under our present government. There is no more reason why the various branches of government should be exempt from liability for their torts than it would be to exempt any other large corporation from liability for its torts.
The injustice of penalizing a victim of the negligence
of a municipal corporation who is in no way responsible
for the unauthorized act has caused some courts, including
our own Supreme Court, to effect a relaxation of the rule
and to construe more broadly certain implied and general
powers of the municipal corporations by holding its acts
not ultra virus which have been, under more strict constructions, held to be governmental functions. For example, in the case of Griffen vs. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah
94, the court said:
"We see no occasion for extending governmental
immunity from liability for tortious acts of employees,
by labeling some activity as a governmental function
simply because the enterprise is municipally owned.
We are particularly adverse to reading something into
the statute which would have the effect of permitting
municipalities to engage in various enterprises only in
a governmental capacity, when such activities are of
the type and character of businesses owned and managed by private citizens for pecuniary profit.
"Municipal ownership of a swimming pool is not
necessarily in a governmental rather than a proprietary capacity merely because statute authorizing cities
to establish and maintain swimming pools also author-
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ized other functions which can be exercised only in
a governmental capacity, since statutory grant of authority to municipality to supervise swimming pools
and recreation places extends to all swimming pools
and places of recreation whether in municipal or private ownership."
This, of course, is a swimming pool case. However,
in practicalities, there is little difference between this case
and the present case. Actually, there is no more of a governmental function in operating a coasting hill than there
is in operating a swimming pool. The Utah Supreme Court
has held that the question of whether such an operation is
done for profit is not the test. The Utah Supreme Court
held this in the case of Burton vs. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah
186, in which it was stated:
"the test is whether the act is for the common good
of all without the element of special corporate
benefit or pecuniary profit. If it is, there is no
liability; if not, there may be liability."
I would suggest to the Court that this is a case in which
Provo City could very easily have operated this coasting
area as is done in many such coasting areas that are pri~
vately owned, and that the mere fact that Provo City un~
dertook this operation does not render it a governmental
function, and also the fact that no charge was made for the
use of the hill does not render it such a function that is gov~
ernmental in nature. Utah Statute, Sec. UCA 1943, 15~8~9,
specifies which functions the city may undertake. How~
ever, it does not by so enumerating these functions make
them governmental functions. The court points this out
in the Griffen case cited above.
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The modern tendency is to restrict the doctrine of municipal immunity, and the rule is laid out generally as follows:
"A municipality cannot escape responsibility for
the careful performance of a duty which is substantially one of a local or corporate nature because it may
inure incidentally to the advantage of the public."
38 A. J. 268, Sec. 574.

Now in this instance, the coasting area was created in
a north-eastern section of the city and was available to only a certain portion of the populace, and was available during a certain portion of the year, and was not a permanent
park or recreation center, and was not, consequently, a
function which is ordinarily within the province of government.
The City of Provo, in creating this coasting area, sent
its agents forth, and established it on the property of Brigham Young University at the top of the hill where the coasting commenced, knowing full well that the hill was extremely steep and that children who used the hill would gain
a great deal of momentum in traveling down the hill, and
that because of the very nature of the physical situation,
the coasters would be unable to stop at the bottom of the
hill and before entering into Eighth North Street in the
City of Provo. And that by merely placing a saw-horse
across the street at the bottom of the incline would not
prevent the momentum of the coasters in carrying them
out into Eighth North Street and into the path of traveling vehicles. This allegation alone raises an issue which
cannot be controverted by the answer of the defendant, Provo City Corporation, nor can their motion to dismiss be sus-
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tained upon the argument that the acts of Provo City and
its agents are governmental functions.
If the danger was so obvious and apparent, as I ·believe
the plaintiff will be able to prove in this case, then the City

cannot escape liability even though its acts might otherwise
have been a governmental function, for the case is not one
of ordinary negligence. Where the employees of the City
are doing purely ministerial acts, which they are in the principal case, and in the doing of these acts they injure a person, they cannot escape responsibility. This principle has
been sustained in the case of Hoggard vs. City of Richmond,
200 S. E. 610, 120 ALR 1368. The court in that case said
in effect that the principle of governmental immunity can
no longer be sustained on any modern theory of law and
justice.
POINT II
THE COMPLAINT [)()ES STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PROVO CITY CORPORATION UPON
THE GROUND THAT THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF
CONSTITUTED AN ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE, AND
THAT BECAUSE OF THESE ACTS, THE PLAINTIFF
·WAS ATTRACTED TO THE COASTING AREA AND INJURED BECAUSE OF ITS INHERENT DANGERS.
The question of whether a coasting area constitutes
an attractive nuisance will be discussed in Point 4. In this
particular argument, I shall establish that a municipal corporation is responsible for its actions in creating a nuisance
which is attractive to children and which, because of its
inherent defects causes injury to a child who is attracted
to it. It has been held in the case of Brown vs. Salt L&ke
City Corporation, 33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570, which is an an-
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alogous case, that the city is responsible where it creates an
attractive nuisance. The court in that case stated:
"If the doctrine of the turntable cases is to be
adopted in this jurisdiction-and we think it should be
-it seems to us that it should be applied in accordance
with the principles laid down by the Chief Justice
Beatty. * * * As against mere intruders or licensees the owner need not maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition; but as to those who come upon
them by invitation, express or implied, he owes the duty
of reasonable care for their safety. That is the general rule, and to depart from it in favor of adult persons would cast a burden upon the ownership and dominion of private property which would be intolerable.
But is this right of dominion and use really invaded
when an exception is made in favor of children of immature judgment and discretion? We have already
pointed out that, as to adults or children who may come
upon another premises either by express or implied invitation, the law imposes the duty upon the owner to
exercise reasonable care for their safety. If, therefore,
the owner places something upon his premises which
is easily accessible to children, and which is alluring
and attractive to their childish propensities, and excites their curiosity and desire for play, it, in effect
amounts to an implied invitation to them to come upon
the premises." Note: Court applied attractive nuisance
doctrine to city.

Admittedly, the Brown case is one involving a conduit
under the city streets; Hlowever, it is nevertheless identical
in the proposition that the child of the plaintiff was attracted to the conduit because of its exciting and recreational
qualities. Children of tender years, such as the plaintiff in
the principal case, are unaware of the apparent risks involved, purely because they are children, although an adult
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could not free himself from the responsibility of asssuming
such a risk, but here we are dealing with children.
In the case before the Court, it is alleged that Provo
City Corporation advertised and publicized the creation of
this coasting area, and the proof will indicate that a newspaper item was given to the Provo Herald, a newspaper of
general circulation within Provo City, stating that the hill
had been created and expressly inviting the use of it. This
makes the principal case a much stronger case than the
Brown case, in that parents placed reliance upon the careful creation, maintainance and supervision of the coasting
area, and that children were induced to use the hill under
the guise of it being a well-regulated and physically safe facility. The plaintiff in this case, thought not of the danger
involved, but only of the thrill of the sleigh ride.

"It has frequently been laid down as a broad, general rule that a muniCipal corporation has no more
right than a private corporation to create or maintain
a nuisance, and that an action lies against a municipality for injuries occasioned by a nuisance in any case
in which, under similar circumstances, such an action
could be maintained against a private corporation."
38 A. J. 355.
The action of Provo City in this case created a situation quite different than the ordinary case of negligence of
a municipal body and its agents. In this case, the wrongful
creation of a situation likely to cause harm to childl'en and
which is apparent and obvious to responsible and prudent
men, puts the defendant, Provo City Corporation, in a position closely related to wilful or intentional wrongdoing.
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The rule in such a situation has been stated in American
Jurisprudence as follows:
"A majority of the courts which have passed upon
the question have held that the immunity of municipal corporations from liability for acts done in the performance of governmental functions does not extend
to cases of personal injuries or death resulting from
a nuisance created or maintained by municipality, and
that a municipality is liable for such injuries, although
the nuisance was created or maintained in the course
of the discharge of public duties or governmental functions."
38 A. J. 358..
POINT III
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF AC~
TION AGAiNST BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY ON
TWO GROUNDS, (1) NEGLIGENCE, AND (2) ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE, AND THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF
BOTH CAUSES ARE SUFFICIENT TO STATE A VALID
CLAIM AT LAW.

In the arguments .of these points in the District Court,
the plaintiff offered to amend his complaint specifically by
inserting the word "negligent" in referring to the acts of
the defendant, Brigham Young University. The court stated that it would not be necessary, for it understood that
the complaint was based upon two theories, i e., negligence,
and attractive nuisance. If there had been any question in
the court's mind as to the cause alleged in the complaint,
the court would have given leave to amend the complaint
to conform with the cause argued upon the motion. The
court's decision is based entirely upon the substantive question of whether Brigham Young University is liable for
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acts done by a third party, Provo City Corporation, upon
its property, Brigham Young University argues that even
though the acts were done by Provo City Corporation, they
did not materially change the natural conditions of the hill
and, therefore, created no condition attractive to children.
And their further contention is that there is no affirmative
negligence of Brigham Young University.
It is always difficult to argue a case on appeal from a
decision of the District Court in favor of the defendant upon
a motion to dismiss, for it puts the appellant in the position
of rebutting the appellant's anticipated argument, for it is
entirely probable that the appellee's argument on appeal will
be quite different than its argument before the District
Court, and because there is no memorandum to indicate upon what particular ground the Court based its conclusion.
Nevertheless, I do not doubt that the defendant, Brigham
Young University, is responsible on both grounds stated
above.
Upon the theory of negligence, Brigham Young University is responsible for the following reasons: (1) That
it allowed Provo City Corporation to come upon its property and establish a coasting course which, by its physical
characteristics, was manifestly dangerous and which any
ordinarily reasonable prudent man could foresee the probable consequences of the creation of this coasting course.
Here, Brigham Young University not only saw the creation of the course but was given notice of it by the publicity given to it by Provo City's own recreation department,
and articles in the Provo Herald, a newspaper, and yet Brigham Young University stood back and closed its eyes to all
the obvious dangers, and then it argues to the court that
it did nothing wrong; that it had no duty to the plaintiff;
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that it by no affirmative act injured the paintiff. Can
it be said that a property owner can sit idly back and allow a third person to invite minor children into a place
of peril, when that property owner had the exclusive control over the hazardous or perilous instrumentality? Argument that the non-feazance of the defendant, Brigham
Young University was not the proximate cause of the injury is not sound. The courts have set down the following
rules for governing such a situation, some of which are set
out as follows.
"Where two wrongdoers contribute to the injury
by negligent act and ommission respectively, negligent
act of one will not exculpate other's negligent ommission."
215 Cal. 449.
"The doctrine may, however, be applied to a condition due to the natural topography of the premise and
partly to the operations carried on thereon. It is not
necessary to charge one with liability that he should
have created the dangerous condition, but the owner
or person in charge may be held liable for injury resulting from his failure to safeguard a dangerous condition created by others with his knowledge and consent, especially where a condition which he created
contributes to the injury."
65 C. J. S. 465, Sec. 29 (7).
Recent cases have firmly established the principle that
non-feasance is tantamount to mis-feasance in cases. of this
nature, and that it is negligence not to prevent the creation of a dangerous condition likely to injure others. The
mere fact that this negligence concurred with the negligence
of another person to cause the injury does not alter the fact
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that the non-fesance will be the proximate cause of the injury. If the injury in this case would not have been caused
but for the negligence of the Brigham Young University,
then clearly the Brigham Young University is responsible.
This is one of those cases in which the ''but for" rule is applicable.
"If negligence of defendant is one of proximate
causes of injury of which plaintiff complains, he cannot escape liability by showing that negligence of third
person also contributed to the injury and that the accident would not have happened but for such negligence
of the third person."

Cummings v. Kendall, 93 P .2d 633, 34 Cal.
App. 2d 379.
"Where concurring acts of different persons although acting independently, combine to produce condition which is actiohabie negligence, each is responsible to injured party for entire result, though act or
negligence alone of one might not have produced the
resUlt complained of."
Missouri ·Motor Distributing Co. v. Baker, 39
P .. 2d 544, 170 Okl. 183.
Even though Provo City Corporation may have used
the land on the property of the Brigham Young University
without permission, and even though the injury to the plaintiff may have occurred off of the property of the Brigham
Young University, if the force that caused the injury was
set in motion on the property of the Brigham Young University, and due to the conduct or lack of it by the Brigham Young University it cannot avoid the responsibility
Shafer v. Keeley Ice Cream Company, 65 Utah 96, 234
P. 300, was a similar case to the principal case, in that it
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involved several tort feasors, and contained the possibilities,
at least at the pleading stage, that one of the defendants
might be an intervening cause, and, in fact, the defendant's
appeal was based upon the very contention that counsel
for Brigham Young University will argue. The Utah Supreme Court in that case cited several c·ases stating what
proximate cause is and to the effect that the question whether the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause was
a question for the jury. It appears that the Utah Supreme
Court adopts the rule expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Milwaukee, etc., Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.
S. 469, at page 474:
"The true rule is, that what is the proximate cause
of an injury is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.
It is not a question of science or of legal knowledge.
It is to be determined as a fact, in view of the circumstances of fact attending it. The primary cause may
be the proximate cause of a disaster, though it may
operate through successive instruments, as an article
at the end of a chain may be moved by a force applied
to the other end, that force being the proximate cause
of the movement, or as in the oft-cited case of the squib
thrown in the market place. 2 B. Rep. 892. The question always is: Was there an unbroken connection between the wrongful act and the injury, a continuous
operation? Did the facts constitute a continuous suesession of events, so linked together as to make a natural whole or was there some new independent cause
intervening between the wrong and the injury? It is
admitted that the rule is difficult of application. But
it is generally held that, in order to warrant a finding
that negligence or an act not amounting to wanton
wrong, is the proximate cause of injury, it must appear
that the injury was the natural and probable conse-
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quence of the negligence or wrongful act, and that it
ought to have been foreseen in the light of the attending circumstances.''
The mere fact that the injury occurs at some other location has no material bearing upon the question of proximate cause. The test is whether the Brigham Young University could have prevented the injury had it exercised
reasonable care and prudence, and if by not so exercising
care and prudence, caused the injury to the plaintiff. The
court stated in Styer v. City of Reading, 61 A.2d 382, 360
Pa. 212, as follows:
"Generally, a property owner who permits a third
person to use his land is, if present, under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as
to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them,
if the owner knows or has reason to know that he has
the ability to control the third person, and knows or
should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising control."
Styer v. City of Reading, 61 A. 2d 382, 360
Pa. 212.
The rule is further stated in the following cases:
"A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to persons outside the land by a structure or other artificial condition thereon, which the
possessor realized, or should realize, as involving an unreasonable risk of such harm, if the possessor has created the condition, or the condition is created by a third
person with the possessor's consent or acquiescence
while the land is in his possesSion."
65 C. J. S. 610, Sec. 94.
McCarthy v. Ference, 58 A.2d 49, 538 Pa. 485.
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"The negligent act or ommission, in order to be
the "proximate cause" of an injury must be the cause
which produces the injury, but need not be the sole
cause, or the last or nearest cause, it being sufficient
if it concurs with some other cause, acting at the same
time, which in combination with it causes the injury or,
it sets in motion a chain of circumstances and operates
on them in a continuous sequence, unbroken by a new
or independent cause; the question being determined,
not by the existence or non-existence or intervening
events, but by their character and the natural connection between the original act or ommission and the injurious consequences.''
Seth v. Commonwealth Electric Co., 89 N. E.
452, 457, 241 Ill 252.
24 LRA U. S. 978.

34 Words and Phrases 759.
As to the question of whether this is an attractive nuisance in which the defendant, Brigham Young University,
is responsible for, we shall have to assume that the acts
alleged in the complaint are true. Brigham Young University will probably argue that there has been no material
change in the natural condition of the hill and therefore,
there is no attractive nuisance. What constitutes sufficient
change in the natural condition of the hill as to make it attractive under the doctrine of attractive nuisance is a question of fact for the jury, as is the question of proximate
cause. It is not within the authority of the trial court to
arbitrarily rule that the negligent acts of the defendant as
alleged in the complaint are not the proximate cause of the
injury, or that the acts complained of do not constitute an
attractive nuisance, for these questions are within the province of the jury.
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Hlow much alteration is sufficient to cause the natural
condition to become extraordinarily attractive is certainly
a question of fact for the jury. In this instance, it has been
alleged that Provo City Corporation placed upon the hill
signs purporting to regulate the traffic of the coasters using the hill, and also that barriers were set up blocking the
course from any other type of traffic, and publicity was
circulated as to the establishment of the area as a coasting
course, all of which are artificial factors tending to change
the natural state of the hill. These are sufficient to alter
the natural condition of the hill to a status in which it attracted children that it would not of its own nature do. It
has been held that:
"Apart from a limited class of objects and conditions which in any event, excite the curiosity and furnish an instrument by which the natural and inborn
instinct of a child for play and adventure can be satisfied for the moment, and which are known to be fraught
with peril to children of tender years who meddle therewith, and another class of objects which are so ordinary, in such common use, and so safe, as to belie any
attempt to discover either an attractive quality or a
danger in them, the particular object involved is not at
all conclusive of iability. The circumstances of size,
location, structure, and contour may render even a sand
pile or a sand bin an attractive nuisance."
38 A. J. 817, Sec. 150. ,
60 ALR 1455.

The test is not the artificialness of the condition, .but
whether · the condition was a sufficient allurement to attract children upon the premises, and that the condition was
fraught with danger to young children such as would reasonably require that precautions be taken to prevent injury
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to the children. It does not matter who created the attractiveness as long as the property owner has reason to anticipate the child's presence, and that injury is likely to occur from the connection between the child and the condition.
"Properly, the reason for the child's presence is
material only as bearing on the question whether his
presence was reasonably to have been anticipated.
* * * argument * * * On principle, therefore, it would
seem that if there was reason to anticipate the presence
of children, it would make no difference how the child
who was injured happened to come upon the premises."
36 ALR 138.
''Under what appears to be a better basis for the
attractive nuisance doctrine namely, that the owner
or occupant owes the duty to use ordinary care for the
safety of children whose presence he reasonably might
anticipate the reason for the injured child's presence
upon the premises is unimportant so long as it appears
that the owner or occupant had reason to anticipate
the presence of children. A proprietor who permits
children to use unsafe premises as a playground must
use reasonable care to prevent them from being injured
by some dangerous instrumentality upon the premises
which, by reason of their childish impulses, m~y be alluring to them."
38 A. J. 812, Sec. 146.
"It is not necessary to charge one with liability
that he should have created the dangerous condition,
but the owner or a person in charge may be held liable
for injury resuting from his failure to safeguard a dangerous condition created by others with his knowledge
and consent, especially where a condition which he
created contributed to the injury."
45 C. J. 768, Sec. 168.
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I think the rule is well established that it matters not
who created the dangerous condition as long as that condition was known to the property owner, or should have been
known by him. In this instance, there is no logical reason
why the Brigham Young University did not know of the
condition or could have known by the use of ordinary care.
Anticipating that the defendant, Brigham Young University, will argue that because the injury occurred outside
the premises of the Brigham Young University, there is no
liability. I think it is sufficient to cite the case of Hynes v.
New York Central R. R. Co., 231 N.Y. 229, 131 N. E. 898,
17 ALR 803. In that case, the defendant's premises abutted on a navigable river, and a springboard had been erected, fastened to defendant's land, and projecting, so that
it was over the river. Plaintiff, with other boys, was
swimming in the river, and climbed on the springboard
to dive therefrom. As he was about to dive, being then
on the end of the springboard over the river, a cross-arm
fell from one of the defendant's poles, carrying with it
high-tension electric wires. The wires struck plaintiff, threw
him from the shattered springboard into the river , and
caused his death. It was held that the defendant could not
escape liability on the ground that the plaintiff was a trespasser merely because the springboard was attached to his
property.
The case is analogous in that injury occurred to the
plaintiff outside the property line of the New York Central
Railroad Company because of a force set in motion by the
defendant, New York Central Railroad Company.
Another case that is in point in this particular is the
case of Rost v. Parker Washington Company, 176 Ill. A.
245, 249, which held:
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"To the contention that there is nothing dangerous per se in a sand pile and that therefore, it is not,
in and of itself, an attractive nuisance, it is near enough
to say that if this be conceded, yet when the sand pile
is placed so near the bank of a river that a fall from the
sand pile would naturally cause a child to fall into the
water, it must be regarded as dangerous, and that it
should reasonably be anticipated and guarded against
by the owner of premises located adjacent to a public
street."
And also the case of Katz v. Helbing, 10 Pac. 2nd 1001,
215 Cal. 449, in which the owners and contractor were held
liable to a streetcar passenger injured by lime thrown by
boys playing near a building being constructed. This was
true even though the injury occurred outside the premises
of the property owner because, it was held, he could reasonably anticipate such an occurrence and should have taken
steps· to prevent it.
"If an injury is produced by concurrent effect of
two separate wrongful acts, each act is the proximate
cause of injury, and neither act can operate as an efficient intervening cause with regard to the other. * * *
The fact that neither party could reasonably anticipate
the occurrence of the other concurrent cause will not
shield him from liability so long as his own negligence
was a cause of injury."

Harper v. Vallejo Housing Authority, 232 P.
2d 262, 104 A. C. A. 791.
"If party guilty of act of negligence might reasonably have anticipated subsequent intervening cause,
which is not consequence of first act of negligence, as
natural and probable consequence of his own negligence,
connection between his negligence and injury is not bro-
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ken; but if act of third person, which is immediate cause
of injury is such as in exercise of reasonable diligence
would not be anticipated, and third person is not under
control of one guilty of first act of negligence, connection is broken and first act or ommission is not "proximate cause" of injury."
Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Cornum, 63 P. 2d 639, 49 Ariz. 1.
It is probable that the defendants will argue that they
are not responsible because of the intervening act of a third
person, Robert E. Clark, in this case. I would simply state
in rebuttal to that argument that no cause is an intervening
cause such as to relieve a person from liability when that
cause can reasonably be anticipated. In this case nothing
could be more obvious that the peril arose from the possibility of the coasters running into cars traveling on Eighth
North Street or Fifth East Street, because the very path
of the course led into those streets.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I think it may justly be said that a case
has been stated in the complaint, and that if there are questions of fact, they should be resolved by a jury. OT if there
are minor errors in pleading, which have caused the defendants no uncertainty as to the plaintiff's contention, the
plaintiff should be allowed to amend his complaint to correct such defects, and that a dismissal of the case upon any
ground is unjust, inequitable, and not in harmony with the
law. The plaintiff, therefore, respectfully requests that the
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decision of the lower court be reversed, that the cause be
remanded to the lower court for trial.
Respectfully submitted,
JACKSON B. HOWARD,
Attorney for Appellant
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